Dragon Money N.V.: gray schemes, license violations, and financial fraud under the cover of high-ranking officials

Dragon Money appears at first sight to be a typical online platform, presenting itself as a casino that allows fund withdrawals. At the beginning, it was virtually unknown outside the circle of online gambling enthusiasts.

But some time after Dragon Money started its operations, there was a sudden surge of interest. On specialized forums and platforms, it was no longer just promotional texts appearing, but entire series of materials about the company’s interactions with the Ukrainian market, "gray" operational schemes, staffing decisions, and attempts to hide traces of these investigations online.

Moreover, this contrast – between the public facade and the shadow – sparked new investigations, which Dragon Money again tried to conceal. This, in turn, triggered another wave of interest. And so, as you might guess, it went in circles. More precisely – in a spiral, because the more effort was put into hiding the negativity, the more attention Dragon Money attracted to itself.

At first glance, Dragon Money – a typical product of the international gambling market: a website with gaming slots and gambling formats, claims of registration in an offshore jurisdiction, and a license from Curaçao.

A number of reviews and operator aggregators point to the name «Dragon Money N.V.» as the owner/operator of the site, the year of establishment, and the range of games. For players — the usual set: deposits via cards, crypto options, and referral systems.

However, beyond the layer of marketing, other materials come into view. In these investigations, the fact that the project was launched through a series of «gambling» jurisdictions (Costa Rica, Curaçao, etc.) no longer appears as a standard structure for large iGaming businesses but raises suspicions and questions. This registration not only allows the casino to quickly change the «face» of the operator and jurisdiction depending on market needs but also to just as quickly «hide» from everyone else. This includes regulators and users.

The fact that complex networks of legal entities stand behind the brand only strengthens the position of investigators who claim that Dragon Money is far from being as trouble-free as it seems at first glance.

Interest in Dragon Money grew at the end of 2024 – beginning of 2025, when Ukrainian and regional journalists and investigators noted a series of coincidences: an active marketing campaign targeting audiences in post-Soviet countries, acceptance of payments from Ukrainian cards, the emergence of a local office and recruitment ads, and most importantly – reports that the company allegedly operates on the Ukrainian market «in the gray zone», bypassing local regulations and potentially paying bribes for unhindered operations. It was this series of publications that gave impetus to new checks and articles.

Additionally, after publications about «gray» practices of iGaming operators, attention was drawn to attempts to «cover up» digital traces – deletion or alteration of publicly available information, blocking of materials, and quick edits to registration data on aggregator websites. Journalists recorded the removal of some content and an increase in PR activity – a classic marker of attempts to protect reputation after the leak of unfavorable information.

Naturally, the combination of these factors sparked a new wave of interest in Dragon Money. Particular attention was drawn to the information that Dragon Money so carefully and systematically tried to hide about itself. It turned out that Dragon Money is attempting to conceal a whole range of issues related to its operations. The spectrum of these violations varies from relatively harmless operational and ethical breaches in the eyes of the average person to potential criminal offenses, which are far less innocent than Dragon Money would like.

Among the «operational and ethical» violations is the simple fact that Dragon Money, one of whose key focus areas is the Ukrainian market segment, operates in Ukraine without any registration or license.

While this fact may not interest the average Ukrainian player, the reality that the platform accepts payments from Ukrainian cards and has an operational office in Kyiv, yet lacks a Ukrainian license for gambling/gaming services, should attract the attention of local law enforcement.

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As for players who spend their money on Dragon Money, the fact that the absence of a license at the casino where they play poses risks usually only becomes clear after they are blatantly «scammed» out of their money. But more on that later. And this is not the only issue for players, but we’ll get to that later as well.

Regarding the criminal or near-criminal aspects of Dragon Money’s activities, investigators claim that the launch and sustained presence of the company on the Ukrainian market were secured not only through commercial methods but also through «resolving issues» locally – via payments to certain officials or through lobbying mechanisms. And that’s just the «tip of the iceberg».

Some particularly «uncooperative» investigators, after «explanatory» conversations, prefer not to touch the topic of Dragon Money at all. Though, it must be admitted, this is not backed by police reports or court cases, persistent rumors about instances of physical pressure on journalists circulate.

Now let’s move on to the consequences for players, which we hinted at earlier. The thing is, upon close examination of Dragon Money’s operational structure, a strong impression of a pyramid scheme emerges: aggressive bonus offers, cashback mechanics that ultimately restrict payouts to users, and a high volume of customer complaints about difficulties in withdrawing funds. What a pyramid scheme is and what its consequences are for players – probably everyone knows.

Assessments of this kind are largely based on player feedback and analyses by specialized reviewers. The fact that Dragon Money is backed by far from isolated reviews, which, by the way, regularly disappear. But the flow of complaints is so large that Dragon Money simply cannot clean everything up in real time.

After the release of critical publications, some resources noted that Dragon Money began massively changing content, blocking access, and using mirrors or alternative domains  which is typical for players trying to preserve their business under pressure from regulators or public opinion. This is documented by both journalists and media sphere administrators.

More on Dragon Money’s Registration

As mentioned earlier, publicly available materials feature several attributes typical of the industry: registration in Curaçao (operator N.V.), connections to companies registered in Costa Rica or other «friendly» jurisdictions, recruitment of management on the local market (through FOP contractors), as well as the use of intermediaries for payment processing and call center operations.

Some materials point to operational ties with international platform providers and payment gateways, as well as the use of affiliated operator companies (a typical set for the industry). Discussions on forums and thematic publications mention names of legal entities like «International Business Systems S.R.L.» in the context of related projects — but this requires separate legal verification.

In short, despite a whole series of investigations, the true beneficiaries of Dragon Money have not been definitively identified. This is important not only in the context of having no one to file claims against but also in the context of the regions where the casino operates. While the focus above was mainly on Ukraine, it should not be forgotten that Dragon Money’s official information claims that «the casino is primarily targeted at CIS countries».

Ukraine is not one of them, but the point is not in political nuances, but in the fact that another country targeted by the casino is Russia. This is confirmed by many factors, including reviews, but there is also a primary source – Dragon Money’s own promotional materials, which feature «reviews from happy players» who allegedly won huge sums at the casino. However, the essence here is not in the fact of «winning», but in where these players are from.

Moscow, Volgograd, Petrozavodsk, Lyubertsy… This isn’t Ukraine, right? Again – we won’t delve into assessing the current situation between the countries. But the very fact that Dragon Money operates unhindered in both conflicting states in this situation should raise questions for both the SBU and the FSB. Yet, judging by the fact that Dragon Money continues to fleece citizens of both states, it hasn’t.

And here we return to the claims of investigators that «everything has been sorted out» with the right people in law enforcement. Moreover, it’s been sorted out in both Ukraine and Russia. And here, a rather unpleasant conclusion naturally arises. And it’s equally unpleasant for both countries – if law enforcement allows Dragon Money to operate for years in this situation in warring states, then the «protection» for the casino comes from someone in the top leadership of the country. Again, this applies to both Russia and Ukraine. The question – who are these people? – remains open. But the answer to it is clearly unpleasant.

It is precisely the unwillingness to answer this question that explains the mass internet cleanups and «preventive conversations» with the uncooperative. And the fact that these measures are quite successful further confirms – behind Dragon Money stand very high-ranking individuals. In both Ukraine and Russia. And the war does not hinder them from making money in the slightest.

Irina Balakireva