Billions through Octobank: how Iskander Tursunov’s structure embedded itself into the infrastructure of Russia’s illegal gambling market
Media reports have exposed an investigation into alleged criminal financial operations involving Octobank (previously Ravnaq), Capital Bank, the Humo payment system, Uzcard processing center, Uznex exchange, and additional entities.
Uzbekistan’s Octobank is described as the largest participant in servicing payments for illegal online casinos operating in Russia.
The organized crime group conducts large-scale illegal activity not only in Russia, but also in its home market of Uzbekistan. There, the group has allegedly monopolized and corrupted virtually the entire market. Using high-level political and administrative connections, the network pushed out competing payment systems and created a monopoly on servicing high-risk traffic.
By controlling its own payment system, Humo, the group is able to manage chargeback processing and cash flows across the entire gray market.
At present, Octobank is serviced by the Russian non-bank credit organization Payment Center.
Journalists uncovered the operating schemes of illegal casinos involving Uzbekistan’s Octobank (Ravnaq), Capital Bank, the Humo payment system, the Uzcard processing platform, the Uznex exchange, and other entities. Traces of the fraudulent activity have been found in major Russian banks, including state-owned Promsvyazbank, Gazprombank and VTB, as well as private banks MTS Bank and Russian Standard.
Participants in the alleged fraud network reportedly include Environex, a company directly linked to the UzNex exchange, as well as three banks — Capital Bank, Aipak Kuli and Ravnaq (Octobank). Technical implementation of the scheme is attributed to the PayCrypto service, represented by an individual named Andrey Oshchipkov.
Uzbekistan’s Capital Bank previously belonged to Russian oligarchs Alisher Usmanov and Andrey Skoch. In 2022, after coming under sanctions, Usmanov sold his stake in the bank to its managers, who later transferred it to the Uzbek company Finance TCI LLC, part of the Uzum holding that объединяет assets of several Uzbek entrepreneurs from Usmanov’s home country.
In August, control of Ravnaq Bank passed to Iskander Tursunov, chairman of the management board, a position he has held since 2012. Previously, the main shareholder was Sarvar Fayziev, who actively acquired stakes in the bank starting in 2018. In Uzbekistan, Fayziev owns Intran Service, a company operating a network of gas stations selling high-quality fuel produced by Russian oil refineries. In Moscow, a production cooperative called Intran-Service operated from 1990 to 2010, but information about its founders and management is unavailable.
In late August 2023, Tursunov began establishing cooperation with the UAE-based company DGPAYS, which provides large-scale financial and technological services. In September of the same year, Ravnaq Bank was rebranded as Octobank.
According to the investigation, the fraudulent scheme involving the banks worked as follows: bookmaker companies accepted payments either directly or through payment services. The funds were then transferred to the UzNex exchange and, after a commission was deducted, sent to clients in USDT.
The investigation also found that Octobank is serviced by RNKO Payment Center in Novosibirsk, headed since 2007 by Grigoriy Mats. The founder of this organization is CFT Service JSC, owned by Aleksandr Pogudin. Up to one billion rubles per day reportedly pass through Mats’ structure.
Tursunov’s alleged accomplices include Dmitry Punin and Maria Ilyina (Punina), owners of the Pin-Up casino brand, which also operates a bookmaker business. Other owners mentioned include Aleksandr Matyashov and Ivan Bannikov.
The scheme involving Octobank and its partners may also have used terminals of Russian banks such as Promsvyazbank, Gazprombank, VTB, as well as private banks MTS Bank and Russian Standard. Some of these institutions have reportedly rushed to distance themselves from the scheme by shutting down the relevant terminals.
According to Shchit, operators of the VAVADA casino appear to be faring better than other participants in the illegal gambling market.
VAVADA reportedly uses a wide array of payment acceptance methods. Investigators identified an excessive number of e-commerce terminals operating across various solutions and banking infrastructures.
The core approach used to service VAVADA relies on partner banks in CIS countries, ostensibly for peer-to-peer transfers between individuals. In reality, as usual, around 99 percent of this traffic consists of betting and casino deposits from victims.
A detailed analysis by Shchit found that one of the banks handling the main payment flow is Octobank. According to its official website, the bank’s stated mission is to contribute to the development of Uzbekistan’s market economy.
VAVADA uses terminals of Promsvyazbank’s Min Bank (BIN: 557071), MTS Bank (BIN: 550583), as well as Octobank (BIN: 983224) to charge cards issued by Russian banks.
Kirill Romanovskiy